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Abstract
The question o f  cen tra l  i n t e r e s t  in t h i s  study was, "do incen t ive  
te s t in g  p i l o t  programs adversely a f f e c t  the performance o f  n o n -p i lo t  
groups?" The cu r ren t  managerial p rac t ice  o f  te s t in g  new mot iva t iona l  
techniques on small subgroups w i th in  an organ iza t ion  provides employees 
w i th  a recognizable discrepancy between the e f f o r t  to  reward payoffs 
among co-workers. Independent var iab les  manipulated in t h i s  study 
were: (a) d i f f e r i n g  leve ls  o f  p re fe re n t ia l  treatment,  and (b) member­
ship versus non-membership in a bonus te s t in g  p i l o t  group. Dependent 
var iab les  included task q u a n t i t y ,  task q u a l i t y ,  sub jec t 's  est imates 
o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  had they been in each o f  fo u r  treatment con d i t ion s ,  
and treatment group a t t rac t iveness  ra t in g s .  Planned comparisons 
revealed th a t  a cash bonus program used throughout the study increased 
task p r o d u c t i v i t y  and was seen by subjects as being a des i rab le  cond i t ion  
to  work under. Comparisons also showed a preference f o r  a work 
s i t u a t io n  in which no worker received bonus payments over a s i t u a t io n  
in which a m in o r i t y  o f  the work fo rce  benef i ted from such payments.
v
A p i l o t  program is a management i n i t i a t e d  program confined to 
a subgroup o f  an o rgan iza t ion  f o r  the.expressed purpose o f  examining 
on a t r i a l  basis and in a c o n t ro l le d  manner the apparent e f fec t iveness 
o f  a new management d i r e c t i v e .
The present study is  concerned p r im a r i l y  w i th  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
and in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  any po ten t ia l  in f luences which p i l o t  programs 
may exer t  upon the performance o f  n o n -p i lo t  groups.
Implemented on a t r i a l  basis, a p i l o t  program enables management 
to exerc ise i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  o rgan iza t iona l  d i r e c t io n  w i thout  
surrender ing i t s  resources and energies to a p o t e n t i a l l y  i n e f f e c t i v e  
or  poss ib ly  harmful endeavor. In a d d i t io n ,  the u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  p i l o t  
programs enables management to  re ta in  a f a r  g rea te r  degree o f  manipu­
l a t i v e  contro l  than is  t y p i c a l l y  found in organ iza t ion  wide programs.
In theory and in te n t  the p i l o t  group serves as a te s t  group 
and as such is useful in the eva luation o f  a program's e f fec t iveness .  
However, care fu l  examination o f  a p i l o t  group's performance often 
reveals th a t  group improvement can be a t t r i b u t e d  to fac to rs  not exc lu­
s iv e ly  a t t r i b u t a b le  to the experimental v a r ia b le ( s )  alone. For example, 
the simple c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  performance c r i t e r i a ,  which often accompanies 
the implementation o f  a p i l o t  program can be a s i g n i f i c a n t  source 
o f  improved p i l o t  group performance. A dd i t iona l  sources o f  po ten t ia l  
performance in f luences inc lude the Hawthorne E f fec t  (Roeth l isberger 
& Dickson, 1939), in te r -g roup  compet i t ion or  group cohesiveness (Zajonc, 
1965), or  superv isory  s t y le  (F ie d le r ,  1967) to name a few. Many 
con t r ib u to ry  in f luences may be overlooked by those charged w i th  the
1
2eva luat ion  o f  p i l o t  group and n o n -p i lo t  group behavior. Furthermore, 
these in f luences may lead to  an inaccurate eva luat ion o f  the t rue  
e f fec t iveness  o f  the procedures being tested by the p i l o t  program.
Organization researchers have attempted to i d e n t i f y  and deal 
w i th  phenomena which may in f luence the performance o f  in d iv id u a ls  
w i th in  a group, indeed, t h i s  is  an important  aspect o f  the heav i ly  
researched f i e l d  o f  soc ia l  psychology. There does e x is t  however, 
a subs tan t ia l  lack o f  adequate observation and analys is  w i th in  an 
organ iza t ion  w i th  respect to  the performance o f  those groups not 
i d e n t i f i e d  as the group o f  pr imar^ concern.
T y p ic a l l y ,  the success or  f a i l u r e  o f  a p i l o t  program is  assessed 
by comparing the p i l o t  group performance w i th  the performance o f  
some con tro l  group. This con tro l  group may be the p i l o t  group p r io r  
to  the in t ro d u c t ion  o f  the p i l o t  program, as in a t im e-ser ies  eva luat ion 
design, or i t  may be a group s im i la r  to  the p i l o t  group but excluded 
fromthe p i l o t  program. Both methods o f  comparison f a i l  to  consider 
what in f luences a p i l o t  program might have on n o n -p i lo t  groups.
In te re s t  in the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  performance in f lu enc ing  fac to rs  
opera t ive  w i th in  a p i l o t  program, or  w i th in  those groups aware o f  
but not p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in a p i l o t  program, stems from two cur ren t  
prac t ices  in modern indus t ry .  F i r s t  is  the increase in p o p u la r i t y  
o f  behavior m o d i f ica t io n  techniques employed in s i tu a t io n s  other 
than s t r i c t  piece ra te  production (Heiman & Lazer, 1975). Second 
is  the widespread use o f  p i l o t  groups as a method by which management 
evaluates t h i s  mo t iva t iona l  procedure (Hamner & Hamner, 1976). According 
to Hamner and Hamner, on ly in recent years have the p r in c ip le s  embodied
3in behavior m od i f ica t io n  been fo rm a l ly  appl ied to ind iv id ua ls  in 
a work s e t t in g .
Reports o f  behavior m od i f ica t io n  p r in c ip le s  appl ied to i n d u s t r i a l  
se t t ings  are f i l l e d  w i th  test imony to the e f fec t iveness  o f  such programs. 
For a review and c r i t i q u e  o f  behavior m od i f ica t ion  in management 
see Sch in ie r  (1974). T y p ic a l l y  such incen t ive  systems are tested 
using a small percentage o f  a p a r t i c u la r  o rg a n iz a t io n 's  work fo rce .
Such a s i t u a t io n  (a m in o r i t y  group p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in a new incent ive  
program wh i le  the m a jo r i t y  o f  the work u n i t  t o i l s  under the standard 
or o ld incen t ive  program) l e n d s ^ i t s e l f  to i n te rp re ta t io n s  o f  d i f f e r e n ­
t i a l  treatment,  and poss ib ly  p re fe re n t ia l  treatment on behal f o f  
the m in o r i t y  or p i l o t  group.
Recent o rgan iza t iona l  behavior m o d i f ica t io n  l i t e r a t u r e  describes 
programs designed to increase the frequency o f  ta r g e t  behaviors which 
are ro u t in e ly  engaged in by a l l  members o f  an o rgan iza t ion .  These 
ta rge t  behaviors inc lude such behaviors as attendance and p u n c tu a l i ty  
(Pedalino & Gamboa, 1974) and simple rou t ine  tasks (Yuk l , Wexley &
Semore, 1972). Frequent ly o rgan iza t iona l  behavior m od i f ica t ion  programs 
re in fo rce  s p e c i f i c  behaviors performed by members o f  a small sample 
of  the work group wh i le  ignor ing  those same behaviors exh ib i ted  by 
those not p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in the p i l o t  program.
In the examples c i te d  above, many o f  which deal w i th  c le a r -  
cut behaviors such as attendance, i t  is  reasonable to assume tha t  
a n o n -p i lo t  group worker would be cognizant o f  a p o l ic y  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
t reatment,  a p o l ic y  tha t  a l loca tes  d i f f e r e n t  leve ls  o f  rewards wh i le  
expecting equ iva lent  leve ls  o f  e f f o r t .
4The idea o f  comparing one's work s i t u a t io n  w i th  another 's  is  
not new. Thi-s:idea is de a l t  w i th  qu i te  e f f e c t u a l l y  by Adams' (1963) 
Equity Theory. Defined by Adams at a l a t e r  date (1965), " in e q u i ty  
ex is ts  f o r  Person whenever he perceives th a t  the r a t i o  o f  his outcomes 
to inputs and the r a t i o  o f  Other 's  outcomes to inputs are unequal"
(p. 423). The concept o f  in e qu i ty  as an imbalance in  some form 
o f  exchange re la t io n s h ip  has been proposed by others (Homans, 1961; 
Patchen,1961). However, i t  was the fo rmula t ion  by Adams and the
!
subsequent research design used to te s t  t h i s  formula tha t  propel led 
Equi ty Theory to the center  s tage^of o rgan iza t iona l  behavior research 
during the 1960s and 1970s. As w i th  other areas o f  m o t iva t iona l  
research, the data presented in  equ i ty  l i t e r a t u r e  are seldom conclusive 
and o f ten  con t rad ic to ry  (Goodman & Friedman, 1971; Lawler, 1968).
The l i t e r a t u r e  does, however, serve to es tab l ish  the fa c t  th a t  " e q u i t y , "  
as a th e o re t ic a l  con s t ruc t ,  is  a useful too l w i th  which to fu r th e r  
our understanding o f  work behavior in  a socia l  s e t t in g .
The increased p o p u la r i t y  o f  o rgan iza t iona l  behavior m od i f ica t ion  
is c le a r  and the frequency w i th  which th is  technique is  int roduced 
by way o f  p i l o t  p ro jec ts  is  equa l ly  apparent. Any concern f o r  the 
possib le in f luence o f  socia l  in te ra c t io n  between p i l o t  and n o n -p i lo t  
group members, be such in te ra c t io n  performance s t imulants  or per­
formance suppresants, has ye t  to  be sys tem at ica l ly  researched. Con­
sequently , the experimental questions to which t h i s  study is addressed 
are: (a) Is there any systemat ic  in f luence  which tends to e f f e c t
p i l o t  group performance so as to produce a greater  d i f fe ren ce  between 
the performances o f  a p i l o t  group and a n o n -p i lo t  group than could
5be accounted f o r  by the benef i ts  being tested? and (b) Is there 
any systematic in f luence which tends to e f f e c t  n o n -p i lo t  group per­
formance so as to produce a grea te r  d i f fe ren ce  between the performances 
o f  a p i l o t  group and a n o n -p i lo t  group than could be accounted fo r  
by the benef i ts  being tested?
In Equi ty Theory terms, components o f  t h i s  "systematic in f luence "  
assume general labe ls  o f  "overpayment ine q u i ty "  when addressing the 
s i t u a t i o n  in which members o f  a p i l o t  group receive benef i ts  from 
which a l l  others have been excluded, and "underpayment in e q u i t y "  
when addressing a s i t u a t io n  in V)hich members o f  a n o n -p i lo t  group 
are excluded from s p e c i f i c  ben e f i t s .
T ra d i t io n a l  labora to ry  te s ts  o f  the equ i ty  model o f ten  e n ta i l  
a ra ther  s t ra ig h t fo rw a rd  manipulat ion o f  overpayment and underpayment 
cond i t ions .  I t  is  not uncommon f o r  the experimenter to exp la in  the 
existence o f  a s t r a t i f i e d  pay ra te  s t r u c tu re ,  be i t  hourly  or piece 
ra te  and then assign subjects to one o f  the usual ly  three ra te  cond i t ions 
(Lane & Messe, 1972). This procedure re s u l ts  in a convenient underpay, 
equ i tab le  pay, and overpay t r i c o n d i t i o n  design. Of course other 
cond i t ions  have been employed in the past to  induce fee l ings  o f  i n e q u i t ­
able t reatment.  Noteworthy examples inc lude the use o f  pra ise or 
c r i t i c i s m  o f  a sub jec t 's  work q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  (Adams & Rosenbaum,
1962; Wiener, 1970) and assignment to  payment cond i t ions  by way o f  
f o r t u i t o u s  (or u n fo r t u i t o u s ) circumstances (P r i tch a rd ,  Dunnette & 
Gorgenson, 1972). For a l i s t i n g  o f  Equi ty studies and ine q u i ty  induc t ion  
methodologies see Adams (1976). Discussion o f  the leg i t im acy  o f  
ego-involvement and treatment by circumstances as e q u i t y / in e q u i t y
6manipulat ions may be found in Andrews and Valenvi (1970), Goodman 
and Friedman (1970) and P r i tcha rd  (1969).
Discussion o f  the d iverse methodologies by which " in e q u i ty "  
is summoned up f o r  examination, whether such methodologies are themselves 
praised or c r i t i c i z e d ,  serves two purposes in the in t roduc t ion  o f  
th i s  study: (a) t h i s  d i v e r s i t y  across methodologies underscores
the d i f f i c u l t y  experimenters have had in  t h e i r  attempts to maintain 
design consistency when in v e s t ig a t in g  a s ing le  theory  across d i f f e r e n t  
experimental cond i t ions .  This is  not to  say tha t  the basic soc ia l 
exchange concepts o f  Equi ty Theory are d i f f i c u l t  to understand, but 
is simply intended to  po in t  out the d i f f i c u l t i e s  and inconsis tenc ies 
which are encountered when at tempting to o p e ra t io n a l ly  def ine e q u i ty /  
ine qu i ty  under d i f f e r e n t  experimental c ond i t ions ,  and (b) by discuss ing 
some o f  the p a r t i c u la r s  o f  past equ i ty  studies i t  may perhaps be 
easier  to  see tha t  t h i s  study is not a true "equ i ty  study" but ra ther  
a study to determine the unintended e f fe c ts  o f  p i l o t  programs on 
the performance o f  both p i l o t  and n o n -p i lo t  groups.
The experimenter sought to use neutra l phrases throughout th is  
study to describe experimental cond i t ions .  Phrases such as, subjects 
were " inc luded in "  or  "excluded from" a "bonus program," and questions 
such as, "what are the po te n t ia l  e f fe c ts  o f  any 'systematic  in f luence '  
which may a r ise  from such condi t ions?"  were p re fer red over the more 
Equity biased labels  o f  overpayment in e q u i ty ,  underpayment inequ i ty  
and equ i ty  re s to ra t io n  reac t ions ,  etc.
I t  should be made c le a r ,  however tha t  throughout the formative 
stages o f  t h i s  experiment the experimenter did r e ly  heav i ly  upon the
7Equi ty model o f  work behavior to help formulate procedural methodologies 
and f a c i l i t a t e  the so lu t io n  o f  methodological problems.
In as much as t h i s  study is  not a t e s t  o f  a theory ,  but ra ther  
an in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  work behavior under s p e c i f i c  work cond i t ion s ,  
the experimenter has e n l is te d  three d i s t i n c t  theor ies  o f  work behavior 
to  a id in the in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  the f ind ings  o f  t h i s  study. S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
the design o f  t h i s  study o f f e r s  useful comparison between the p re d ic t i v e  
a b i l i t i e s  o f  Equity  Theory, Reinforcement Theory and the Hawthorne 
E f fe c t .  Further d iscussion o f  the appropriateness o f  a comparison 
between these three theor ies  is*phesented in the hypotheses section 
o f  t h i s  paper.
The experimental questions addressed in t h i s  study required 
the use o f  a d i f f e r e n t i a l  pay s t ruc tu re  cons is ten t  w i th  the p rac t ice  
o f  u t i l i z i n g  p i l o t  groups in the te s t in g  o f  the usefulness o f  a newly 
implemented behavior m o d i f ica t io n  incen t ive  system. To t h i s  end 
the experimenter selected a d i f f e r e n t i a l  pay manipula t ion th a t  p a ra l l e l s  
the in t rod u c t io n  o f  a piece ra te  or contingent re inforcement pay 
schedule upon an already e x is t in g  hourly  incen t ive  system.
The independent var iab les  manipulated in t h i s  study were:
(a) d i f f e r i n g  leve ls  o f  p re fe re n t ia l  t reatment,  and (b) membership/ 
non-membership in a bonus te s t in g  p i l o t  group. Comparisons were 
based upon fou r  separate treatment groups.
Subjects in group one were aware o f  the f a c t  th a t  they were 
members o f  a m in o r i t y  group rece iv ing  p re fe re n t ia l  treatment.  Group 
one was labeled the Experimental Bonus Group (E^).
Subjects in group two were aware o f  the fa c t  tha t  they were
8members o f  a m a jo r i t y  group which had been deprived o f  the op por tun i ty  
to p a r t i c ip a te  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program. Group two was labeled 
the Experimental No Bonus Group (E ^.).
Subjects in group three worked under the same bonus cond i t ion  
as group E^, however, because members o f  group three were to ld  tha t  
a l l  subjects in the experiment were working under the same bonus 
con d i t ion ,  t h e i r  treatment would not be considered as p r e f e r e n t i a l . 
Group three was labeled the Control Bonus Group (C^).
Subjects in group fou r  worked under the same no bonus cond i t ion  
as group E ^  however, because members o f  group fou r  were to ld  tha t  
a l l  sub jects in the exper iment were working under the same no bonus 
c o n d i t io n ,  t h e i r  treatment would not be described as being one o f  
de p r iva t ion .  Group fou r  was labeled the Control No Bonus Group ( C ^ ) .
P re fe ren t ia l  and de p r iva t ion  treatment were o p e ra t io n a l ly  defined 
as p a r t i c ip a t io n  in o r  exc lus ion from, a cash bonus payment program. 
Dependent var iab les  were: (a) task q u a n t i t y ,  (b) task q u a l i t y ,
(c) sub jec ts '  speculat ion as to  t h e i r  own leve ls  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
had they been in each o f  the fo u r  experimental co nd i t ions ,  and
(d) sub jec ts '  ranking o f  the r e la t i v e  a t t rac t iveness  o f  the fou r  
te s t  cond i t ions .  These dependent var iab les  al lowed exp lo ra t ion  o f  
the e f fe c ts  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  treatment from a behavioral (a & b)
as well  as a co g n i t i v e  (c & d) o r ie n ta t io n .
Hypotheses
Bonus program. The f i r s t  three hypotheses were formulated to 
te s t  the e f fec t iveness  o f  the bonus program used throughout t h i s  
study.
9An abundance o f  Reinforcement Theory l i t e r a t u r e  (Berger, Cumming 
& Heneman, 1972; Chung & V ickery ,  1976; Y uk l , Latham & P u rs e l l ,  1976) 
supports the p red ic t ion  th a t  workers rece iv ing  a cash bonus w i l l  
complete a g reate r  number o f  work un i ts  than w i l l  workers rece iv ing 
no bonus. Hypothesis one was sta ted as fo l lo w s :
H 1. The qu an t i t y  o f  work produced by a group (C^) given a piece 
ra te  bonus f o r  work produced w i l l  be greater  than the q u a n t i t y  o f  work 
produced by a s im i la r  group (C ^)  not given a bonus f o r  work produced. 
(Test;  One T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a n t i t y  = C Note - 
Comparisons between responses from subjects in group C^ w i th  responses 
o f  subjects  in group C ^ o n ly . )
Pre l im inary  te s ts  were conducted to evaluate the usefulness o f  
the planned bonus program. S p e c i f i c a l l y  these te s ts  were intended to 
give the experimenter in s ig h t  in to  the behavioral and cog n i t ive  e f fe c ts  
o f  the bonus program as well  as some p ra c t ica l  experience w i th  regards 
to adm in is t ra t ion  o f  the program. Results o f  these te s ts  showed tha t  
the bonus program did not in f luence work behavior to  any appreciable 
degree. The experimenter be l ieves th a t  the probable cause o f  t h i s  was 
the shor t  t r i a l  per iod (10 minutes) and the small cash amounts involved. 
These two fac to rs  appeared to combine to provide sub jects  w i th  incon­
sequentia l amounts o f  cash and perceived inapprec iab le  d i f fe rences  o f  
payof f  between high and low performers. The length o f  the experimental 
task period used in the actual study was set at f o r t y - f i v e  minutes^ w i th  
the leve l  o f  cash incen t ive  such th a t  a sub ject might e a s i ly  earn over 
two d o l la r s  during the t e s t  session. Hypothesis One was proposed in 
order to te s t  the bonus program under the actual experimental cond i t ions .
Although p re l im ina ry  tes ts  d id  not show the bonus program to i n f l u ­
ence work behavior to  an appreciable degree, they did demonstrate th a t
the bonus program was recognized by subjects  as being more des i rab le
than the no bonus cond i t ion .  For t h i s  reason i t  was also pred ic ted 
(H 2) that workers would s ta te  th a t  they would complete more work un i ts  
i f  they received a cash bonus than i f  they received no cash bonus, and 
(H 3) th a t  workers would s ta te  th a t  they would f in d  work cond i t ions  in 
which they received a cash bonus more des i rab le  than work cond i t ions  in
which they received no bonus. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were sta ted as fo l lows
H 2. Subjects in a l l  g roups^wi l l  s ta te  tha t  they be l ieve they 
would complete more task un i ts  i f  they were members o f  a work group 
(C^) rece iv ing  a cash bonus f o r  task un i ts  completed than i f  they 
were members of  a work group (C ^ ) rece iv ing  no bonus incen t ive .
(Test;  One T a i l ,  Wilcoxan Matched Pa ir  Signed Ranks T - te s t ;  specula t ive 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , = C Note - Comparisons between responses about
cond i t ions  & C ^ from a l l  sub jects in a l l  groups).
H 3. Subjects in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they w i l l  f i n d
\t more des i rab le  to be members o f  a work group (C^) rece iv ing  a
bonus f o r  work produced than to  be members o f  a work group (C
rece iv ing  no bonus incen t ives .  (Test; One T a i l ,  Sign Test,  a t t r a c t i v e ­
ness r a t in g s ,  = C Note -  Comparisons between responses about
cond i t ions  C^ & C ^ from a l l  subjects  in a l l  groups.)
P i l o t  group e f f e c t . The next fou r  hypotheses were formulated 
to help answer the experimental question: Are there any systematic
in f luences which tend to e f f e c t  p i l o t  group performances so as to 
produce greate r  d i f fe rences  between the performances o f  a p i l o t  group
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and a n o n -p i lo t  group than could be accounted f o r  by the company 
bene f i ts  being inves t iga ted?
Task q u a n t i t y .  The experimental design o f  t h i s  study, and the 
p re fe re n t ia l  treatment cond i t ions  under which p i l o t  group performances 
were tested al lows comparisons to be made between the p re d ic t i v e  
a b i l i t i e s  o f  three estab l ished theor ies  o f  human behavior . The th re e ,  
theor ies  o f  i n te r e s t  are: Equi ty Theory (Adams, 1965), Reinforcement
Theory (Skinner, 1969), and the Hawthorne E f fe c t  (Roeth l isberger 
& Dickson, 1939).
Equity Theory proposes tha t  tinder the p re fe re n t ia l  treatment 
cond i t ions  o f  t h i s  experiment, workers in group E^ would be subject 
to overpayment anx ie t ies  and would consequently r e s t r i c t  (compared 
to group C^) t h e i r  inputs in an attempt to con tro l  those excessive 
outcomes which are t i e d  d i r e c t l y  to inputs (Adams, 1963). Based 
upon Equity Theory, the dependent var iab les  o f  task qu an t i t y  (H 4
a) ,  specula t ive p r o d u c t i v i t y  (H 4 c ) ,  and a t t ra c t ive ne ss  ra t ings  
(H 4 d) were pred ic ted to  be less f o r  group E^ than f o r  group C^.
Reinforcement Theory holds tha t  behavior is  determined by the 
h is to r y ,  contingency,  and value o f  behavior re la ted  consequences 
(Skinner, 1969). In keeping with  t h i s  l i n e  o f  reasoning the actual 
schedule o f  bonus payments, the contingency o f  the bonus payment 
and the value o f  the bonus program should be major determinants o f  
sub jec ts '  behavior. Based upon Reinforcement Theory there appears 
to be no basis f o r  p re d ic t in g  tha t  the dependent va r iab les  o f  task 
q u a n t i t y  (H 5 a ) ,  task q u a l i t y  (H 5 b ) ,  specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
(H 5 c) and a t t rac t ive n ess  ra t in g  (H 5 d) would be d i f f e r e n t  f o r
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group as compared to group C^.
The Hawthorne E f fe c t  can be described as the temporary improvement 
in worker p r o d u c t i v i t y  which is  associated w i th  a change in the working 
cond i t ion  but which is  u l t im a te ly  the re s u l t  o f  improved morale ra the r  
than any real improvement in  the work environment (Roeth l isberger 
& Dickson, 1939). Based upon the Hawthorne E f fe c t ,  the dependent 
va r iab les  o f  task q u a n t i t y  (H 6 a ) ,  task q u a l i t y  (H 6 b ) ,  specu la t ive  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  (H 6 c ) ,  and a t t ra c t ive ne ss  ra t ings  (H 6 d) were predic ted 
to be grea te r  f o r  group E^ than group C^.
A unique hypothesis was formulated f o r  each dependent va r ia b le
as i t  re la ted  to each o f  the three theor ies  under examination. Although
the procedure resu l ted  in a large number o f  hypotheses, the use o f
s p e c i f i c  hypotheses f o r  each o f  corresponding theory  prepared the 
way f o r  an o rd e r ly  d iscussion o f  re s u l t s .
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  poss ib le  p i l o t  group e f fec ts  as such 
e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent v a r ia b le  o f  task qu an t i t y
were stated as fo l lo w s :
H 4 a. Members o f  a work group (E^) rece iv ing  a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  
treatment w i l l  produce a lower q u a n t i t y  o f  task un i ts  than w i l l  members 
o f  a work group (C^) rece iv ing  a bonus when said bonus represents 
a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work groups. (Test;  Two T a i l ,  Mann- 
Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a n t i t y ,  E^ = C^. Note - Comparison between 
responses from E^ & o n ly . )
H 5 a. Members o f  a work group (E^) who are rece iv ing  a bonus
as p r e fe re n t ia l  treatment w i l l  produce the same qu an t i t y  o f  task
un i ts  as w i l l  members o f  a work group who are rece iv ing  tha t  same
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bonus when such a bonus represents a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  
work groups. (Test; Two T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a n t i t y ,
Efa = Cb . ^ote “ Comparisons between responses from groups E^ & 
o n l y . )
H 6 a. Members o f  a work group (E^) rece iv ing  a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l
treatment w i l l  produce a higher qu an t i t y  o f  task un i ts  than w i l l  
members o f  a work group (C^) rece iv ing  tha t  same bonus when such 
a bonus represents a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work groups.
(Test ;  Two T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ,  q u a n t i t y  E^ = C^. Note - 
Comparisons between responses ffrom groups E^ & o n ly . )
Task q u a l i t y .  Based upon piece ra te  work c o n d i t ion s ,  Equity 
Theory p red ic ts  th a t  the dependent va r iab le  o f  task q u a l i t y  (H 4
b) w i l l  be grea te r  f o r  group E^ than f o r  group C^. This higher q u a l i t y  
o f  work is  a t t r i b u t a b le  to a worker 's  perceived need to increase 
task re la ted  inputs  in an e f f o r t  to earn tha t  po r t ion  o f  his payments 
which he considers excessive (Walster, Bersheid & Walster ,  1973). 
Reinforcement Theory and Hawthorne E f fec t  p red ic t ions  (H 5 b & H 
6 b) are based upon the same arguments presented above.
H 4 b. Members o f  a work group (E^) rece iv ing  a bonus as preferen­
t i a l  treatment w i l l  produce task un i ts  o f  a higher q u a l i t y  than w i l l  
members o f  a work group (C^) rece iv ing  a bonus when said bonus represents 
a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work groups. (Test;  Two Ta i l  Mann- 
Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a l i t y ,  E^ = C^. Note - Comparisons between
responses from group E^ & C^ o n ly . )
H 5 b. Members o f  a work group (E^) who are rece iv ing  a bonus
as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment w i l l  produce task un i ts  o f  the same q u a l i t y
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as w i l l  members o f  a work group (C^) who are rece iv ing  th a t  same 
bonus when such a bonus represents a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  
work groups. (Test; Two T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a l i t y ,
Eb = Cb. Note - Comparisons between responses from groups 
o n l y . )
H 6 b. Members o f  a work group (E^) rece iv ing  a bonus as pre feren­
t i a l  treatment w i l l  produce task un i ts  o f  a higher q u a l i t y  than w i l l  
members o f  a work group (C^) re ce iv ing  the same bonus when such
a bonus represents a leve l o f  paymnet common to a l l  work groups.
, *
(Test; Two T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a l i t y ,  E^ = C^. Note - 
Comparisons between responses from groups E^ & C^ o n ly . )
Speculat ive p ro d u c t i v i t y .  The Equity  Theory p re d ic t io n  is  based 
upon the ex is tence o f  overpayment an x ie t ies  and the re s u l t i n g  m ot iva t ion  
to con tro l  excessive outcomes (Adams, 1963) as discussed elsewhere.
The Reinforcement Theory and Hawthorne E f fe c t  p red ic t ions  (H 5 c 
& H 6 c) are based upon the same arguments presented above.
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  possib le p i l o t  group e f fe c ts  as such 
e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent va r ia b le  o f  specu la t ive  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  were stated as fo l lo w s :
H 4 c. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they be l ieve  tha t  
they would produce less i f  they were members o f  a work group (E^) 
rece iv ing  a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment than i f  they were members 
o f  a work group (C, ) rece iv ing  tha t  same bonus when such a bonus 
represents a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work groups. (Test;
Two T a i l ,  Wilcoxan Matched Pa ir  Signed Rank T - te s t ;  specu la t ive  
p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  E^ = C^. Note - Comparisons between responses about
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cond i t ions from a l l  subjects in a l l  groups.)
H 5 c. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  th a t  they be l ieve they
would produce the same q u a n t i t y  o f  work un i ts  as members o f  a work 
group (E^) rece iv ing  a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment as they would 
as members o f  a work group (G^) rece iv ing  th a t  same bonus when such 
a bonus represented a leve l  o f  payment common to  a l l  work groups.
(Test ; Two Ta i l  Wilcoxan Matched Pair  Signed Ranks T - t e s t ;  specu la t ive  
p r o d u c t i v i t y , E^ = C^. Note - Comparisons between responses about 
cond i t ions E^ & from a l l  subjects in a l l  groups.)
H 6 c. Workers in a l l  groupk w i l l  s ta te  th a t  they be l ieve they
would produce a grea te r  q u an t i t y  o f  work i f  they were members o f  
a work group (E^) rece iv ing  a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment than 
i f  they were members o f  a work group (C^) rece iv ing  tha t  same bonus 
when such a bonus represented a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work 
groups. (Test; Two T a i l ,  Wilcoxan Matched Pa ir  Signed Ranks T - te s t ;  
specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y  E^ = C^. Note - Comparisons between responses 
about cond i t ions  & C^ from a l l  subjects in a l l  groups.)
A t t rac t iveness  Ratings. The Equity  Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 4 d) 
is based upon the Adams argument presented e a r l i e r  and the Reinforce­
ment Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 5 d) and the Hawthorne Theory p red ic t ion  
(H 6 d) are based upon the same arguments presented above.
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  poss ib le p i l o t  group e f fe c ts  as such 
e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent v a r ia b le  o f  treatment cond i t ion  
a t t rac t ive n ess  ra t in g  were sta ted as fo l lo w s :
H 4 d. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they would f in d  
the prospect o f  working in a work group (E^) which was rece iv ing  a
16
bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment less a t t r a c t i v e  than the prospect of 
working in a work group (C^) rece iv ing  the same amount o f  bonus, when 
such a bonus represents a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work groups. 
(Test; Two T a i l ,  Sign Test;  a t t rac t ive ness  ra t in g s ,  from
a l l  subjects in a l l  groups.) ■
H 5 d. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they would f in d
the prospect o f  working in a work group which is  rece iv ing  a bonus
as p r e fe re n t ia l  treatment no more or less a t t r a c t i v e  than the prospect 
o f  working in a work group rece iv ing  the same bonus when such a bonus 
represented a leve l  o f  payment dommon to a l l .w o rk  groups. (Test;
Two T a i l ,  Sign Test;  a t t ra c t ive ne ss  r a t i n g ,  = C^. Note - Comparisons 
between responses about cond i t ions  E^ & from a l l  subjects in a l l  
groups.)
H 6 d. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they would f in d
the prospect o f  working in a work group (E^) which was rece iv ing
a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment more a t t r a c t i v e  than the prospect 
o f  working in a work group (C^) rece iv ing  tha t  same bonus when such 
a bonus represented a leve l  o f  payment common to a l l  work groups.
(Test; Two T a i l ,  Sign Test; a t t rac t iveness  r a t in g ,  E^ = C^. Note - 
Comparisons between responses about cond i t ions E^ & C^ from a l l  subjects 
in a l l  groups.)
The p red ic t ions  supported by the above theor ies  are near ly  mutual ly  
exc lus ive .  That is  to say, the possible outcomes f o r  each o f  the 
above comparisons (H 4, H 5 & H 6) supports only one o f  the three 
theor ies  under in ve s t i  ga t ion ,  as shown below:
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Quanti t.y Qua! i t.y
H 4 a: Equi ty (E, < C, ) H 4 b
H 5 a: Reinforcement (E. = C.) H 5 b
H 6 a: Hawthorne E f fe c t  (E£ > c£) H 6 b
Equity (E, > C. )
Reinforcement (E, = C,) 
Hawthorne E f fe c t  (E^ > C^)
Speculat ive P ro d u c t i v i t y  A t t rac t iveness  Ratings
H 4 c: Equity ( E. < C, ) H 4 d
H 5 c: Reinforcement (E, = C.) H 5 d
H 6 c: Hawthorne E f fe c t  (E^ > C^) H 6 d
Equi ty (E. < C, )
Reinforcement (E, = C,) 
Hawthorne E f fe c t  (E^ > C^)
There is  one exception to t h i s  mutual e x c lu s i v i t y  which centers 
around the dependent va r ia b le  o f  task q u a l i t y .  In t h i s  case both 
Equi ty Theory and the Hawthorne E f fe c t  support the p re d ic t io n  tha t  
members o f  a work group rece iv ing  p re fe re n t ia l  treatment w i l l '  produce 
work un i ts  o f  a higher q u a l i t y  than w i l l  members o f  a work group 
who are rece iv ing  the same bonus when such a bonus represents a level 
o f  payment common to a l l  groups (H 4 b & H 6 b).
N on -p i lo t  group e f f e c t . The f i n a l  fou r  hypotheses were formed 
to help answer the experimental question: Are there  any systematic
in f luences which tend to a f f e c t  n o n -p i lo t  group performances so 
as to produce greater  d i f fe rences  between the performances o f  a p i l o t  
group and a n o n -p i lo t  group than could be accounted f o r  by the company 
b ene f i ts  being invest iga ted?
As in the te s ts  o f  p i l o t  group performances, the design o f  t h i s  
study al lows f o r  a comparison between the pred ic t ions  o f  Equity Theory 
and Reinforcement Theory (the Hawthorne E f fec t  no longer represents 
a p o t e n t i a l l y  re levant  explanation f o r  the outcomes generated by 
in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  the performance o f  n o n -p i lo t  groups).
Equity Theory proposes th a t  under the dep r iva t ion  treatment 
cond i t ions  o f  t h i s  experiment, members o f  group E ^ would be sub ject
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to underpayment anx ie t ies  and would consequently r e s t r i c t  (compared 
to group C t h e i r  inpu t  in an attempt to resolve these fee l ings  
o f  ine qu i ty .  Based upon Equi ty Theory research in v e s t ig a t in g  underpay 
hourly  in e q u i t ie s  (Adams, 1965; Walster , Walster  & Berscheid, 1978) 
the dependent var iab les  o f  task q u a n t i t y  (H 7 a ) ,  task q u a l i t y  (H 
7 b ) ,  specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y  (H 7 c) and a t t ra c t ive n ess  ra t ings 
(H 7 d) were pred ic ted to be less f o r  group E ^ than f o r  group C
According to Reinforcement Theory, there  is no reason to p red ic t  
th a t  the dependent var iab les  o f  task qu a n t i t y  (H 8 a ) ,  task q u a l i t y  
(H 8 b ) ,  specu la t ive  p roduc t !v i t tyv (H 8 c) and a t t rac t ive ness  ra t ings  
(H 8 d) would be d i f f e r e n t  f o r  groups E ^ and C
As w i th  tes ts  f o r  poss ib le p i l o t  group e f f e c t s ,  a unique hypothesis 
was formulated f o r  each dependent v a r ia b le  as i t  re la ted  to Equi ty 
Theory and Reinforcement Theory.
Task q u a n t i t y .  The Equi ty Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 7 a) and the 
Reinforcement Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 8 a)are  based upon the arguments 
presented above.
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  possib le n o n -p i lo t  group e f fec ts  as 
such e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent va r ia b le  task qu an t i t y  
were stated as fo l lo w s :
H 7 a. Members o f  a work group ( E ^ )  who are aware o f  but denied 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program w i l l  produce fewer task 
un i ts  than w i l l  members o f  a work group (C ^ ) excluded from the same 
bonus program when such excluded group has no knowledge o f  the existence 
o f  a bonus program. (Test; Two T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ,  q u a n t i t y ,  
E . = C . . Note - Comparisons between responses from groups E , &
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Cnb o n ly ' )
H 8 a. Members o f  a work group ( E ^ ) who are aware o f  but denied
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program w i l l  produce the same
q uan t i t y  o f  task un i ts  as members o f  a work group (C ) who are excluded
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from th a t  same bonus program when such excluded group has no knowledge 
o f  the existence o f  a bonus program. (Test; Two T a i l ,  Mann-Whitney 
U S t a t i s t i c ,  q u a n t i t y ,  = C ^ .  Note - Comparisons between responses 
from groups Enb & Cnb o n ly . )
Task q u a l i t y .  The Equity Theory p red ic t io n  (H 7 b) and the 
Reinforcement Theory p r e d i c t i o n * ^  8 b) are based upon the arguments 
presented above.
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  poss ib le n o n -p i lo t  group e f fec ts  as 
such e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent v a r ia b le  task q u a l i t y  
were sta ted as fo l lo w s :
H 7 b. Members o f  a work group (E b) w*10 are aware but denied 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program w i l l  produce task un i ts  
o f  lower q u a l i t y  than w i l l  members o f  a work group (C b) excluded 
from the same bonus program when such excluded work group has no 
knowledge o f  the existence o f  a bonus program. (Test; Two T a i l ,  
Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a l i t y ,  Enb = Cnb- Note - Comparisons 
between responses from group E b & Cnb o n ly . )
H 8 b. Members o f  a work group (E who are aware o f  but denied 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program w i l l  produce task un i ts  
o f  the same q u a l i t y  as w i l l  members o f  a work group (Cnb) who are 
excluded from th a t  same bonus program when such excluded group has 
no knowledge o f  the existence o f  a bonus program. (Test; Two T a i l ,
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Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c ;  q u a l i t y ,  E ^ = C Note - Comparisons 
between responses from groups E ^ & C ^ o n ly . )
Specu lat ive p r o d u c t i v i t y .  The Equity Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 7 
c) and the Reinforcement Theory p red ic t io n  (H 8 c) are based upon 
the arguments presented above.
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  poss ib le  n o n -p i lo t  group e f fe c ts  as 
such e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent v a r ia b le  o f  specu la t ive  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  were sta ted as fo l lo w s :
H 7 c. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they be l ieve they
would produce fewer task un i ts  i f* -they were members o f  a work group 
who were aware o f  but denied p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus 
program than i f  they were members o f  a work group who were excluded 
from the same bonus program when such excluded work group had no 
knowledge o f  the existence o f  a bonus program. (Test ; Two T a i l ,  
Wilcoxan Matched Pair  Signed Ranks T - te s t ;  specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,
E ^ = ^ote “ Comparisons between responses about condi t ions
Enb & f rom al 1 sub jects  in a l l  groups.)
H 8 c. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they be l ieve they
would produce the same q u a n t i t y  o f  task un i ts  as members o f  a work
group (E who were aware o f  but denied p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  
bonus program as they would as members o f  a work group (C ^) who 
were excluded from the same bonus program when such excluded work 
group had no knowledge o f  a bonus program. (Test ; Two T a i l ,  Wilcoxan 
Matched Pair Sign Rank T - te s t ;  specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y  E ^ = C ^
Note - Comparisons between responses about cond i t ions  E ^ & C ^ from 
a l l  subjects  in a l l  groups.)
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A t t rac t iveness  ra t in g s .  The Equity  Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 7 d) 
and the Reinforcement Theory p re d ic t io n  (H 8 d) are based upon the 
arguments presented above.
Hypotheses in v e s t ig a t in g  poss ib le n o n -p i lo t  group e f fe c ts  as 
such e f fe c ts  may be measured by the dependent va r ia b le  o f  treatment 
cond i t ion  a t t rac t iveness  ra t in g  were sta ted as fo l lo w s :
H 7 d. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  th a t  they would f in d
the prospect o f  working in a work group in which members were aware
o f  but denied p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program less a t t r a c t i v e  
than the prospect o f  working i n ^ w o r k  group whose members were excluded 
from the same bonus program when such excluded group had no knowledge 
o f  the existence of  a bonus program. (Test;  Two T a i l ,  Sign Test;  
a t t rac t ive n e ss  r a t in g s ,  E ^ = C ^ .  Note - Comparisons between responses 
about cond i t ions  E ^ & C ^ from a l l  subjects in a l l  groups.)
H 8 d. Workers in a l l  groups w i l l  s ta te  tha t  they would f i n d
the prospect o f  working in a work group (E whose members were
aware o f  but denied p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in an a t t r a c t i v e  bonus program 
no more or less a t t r a c t i v e  than the prospect o f  working in a work 
group (C in which members were excluded from the same bonus program 
when such excluded group had no knowledge o f  the bonus program. (Test;
Two T a i l ,  Sign Test;  a t t rac t ive n ess  r a t i n g ,  E ^ = C Note - Compari­
sons between responses about cond i t ions  E ^ & C ^ from a l l  subjects 
in a l l  groups.)
Method
Subjects
Seventy-four subjects were re c ru i te d  through the Psychology
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Department sub ject  pool.  A l l  subjects  were informed th a t  they would 
be working on a t e s t  v a l i d a t io n  p ro je c t  f o r  approximately one and 
one quar te r  hours. A l l  sub jects received extra  course c r e d i t  in 
t h e i r  in t ro d u c to ry  psychology class f o r  t h e i r  experimental p a r t i c i ­
pation .
Materia l
The procedure used to  produce sub ject  p r o d u c t i v i t y  data was 
a symbol re co g n i t io n ,  symbol counting task. Both a shor t  form (Appendix 
A) and a long form (Appendix B) was used. Whereas the short  form 
al lowed subjects  to record the i i *  responses d i r e c t l y  on the task sheet, 
the long form required a set o f  separate answer sheets. Answer sheets 
were o f  two v a r ie t i e s .  One vers ion (Appendix C) contained a yes- 
no question regarding sub jec ts '  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the bonus cond i t ion .
The o ther  vers ion (Appendix D) contained no reference to the bonus 
cond i t ion .
In s t ru c t io n s  f o r  the short  form o f  the task (Appendix E) included 
a b r i e f  de sc r ip t io n  o f  the short  form, three in s t r u c t i v e  statements 
regarding the c o r re c t  method o f  scor ing the task ,  and an example 
o f  a completed task l i n e .
In s t ru c t io n s  f o r  the long form o f  the task were o f  three v a r ie t i e s .  
A l l  " long form" in s t ru c t io n s  included a b r i e f  in t ro d u c t io n  to the 
long form as well  as three in s t r u c t i v e  statements regarding the co r rec t  
method o f  scor ing the task.
Version one o f  the in s t r u c t io n s  included a d e sc r ip t io n  o f  a 
bonus system, and an announcement th a t  on ly a se le c t  few would be 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in t h i s  program (Appendix F). This vers ion was given
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to groups and £ Groups E^ and E ^  thus learned th a t  on ly group
E^ would receive bonus payments.
Version two o f  the in s t r u c t io n s  included a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  the
bonus program as wel l  as an announcement th a t  a l l  subjects would
p a r t i c i p a te  in the bonus (Appendix G). This vers ion was given to 
group on ly .
Version three o f  the in s t r u c t io n s  contained no reference to 
bonus payments but inc luded on ly tha t  in format ion common to a l l  three 
vers ions (Appendix H). This version was given to group on ly .
Procedure *
The t o t a l  sub ject  popula t ion o f  74 was d iv ided in to  fou r  groups 
w i th  sub ject  numbers o f  19, 19, 19 and 17. Each group was independently 
re c ru i te d  and scheduled. This d i v is io n  was f o r  the sole purpose 
o f  p rov id ing  the experimenter w i th  smaller more manageable group 
s izes.  Experimental sessions were scheduled tw ice a week f o r  two 
consecut ive weeks.
Each o f  the experimental t e s t  sessions was conducted in a large 
classroom on the U n ive rs i t y  campus. The classroom contained 92 s ta t io na ry  
cha irs  each w i th  i t s  own swing up desk top. The seating arrangement 
al lowed f o r  adequate and uniform separation o f  treatment groups as 
the experiment progressed.
A f te r  subjects a r r ived  a t  the te s t  s ig h t ,  the purpose o f  the 
meeting was reviewed and a cover s to ry  was conveyed by way o f  reading 
from a prepared statement (Appendix I ) .  The cover s to ry  sta ted tha t  
the experimenter was a jou rna l ism  student who had developed and was 
now at tempting to v a l id a te  a new form o f  proofreading ap t i tude  t e s t .
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Subjects were to complete two forms o f  the new ap t i tude  t e s t .  Toward
the end o f  the session subjects would be tested on the standardized
>
"C a l i f o rn ia  Test o f  Proofreading Ap t i tude"  ( f i c t i t i o u s )  and the j o u r ­
nal ism student would then have the data necessary to v a l id a te  his 
new ap t i tude  t e s t .
Fol lowing t h i s  announcement, the experimenter d i s t r i b u te d  the 
short  form o f  the experimental task ,  along w i th  i t s  i n s t r u c t io n s .
Subjects were al lowed to work on the short form f o r  a period o f  seven 
minutes, a f t e r  which t ime the experimenter co l lec ted  the shor t  forms 
and announced a b r i e f  ( f i v e  minClte) res t  period. During the res t  
period the experimenter scored and ranked the short  forms on the 
basis o f  q u a n t i t y  o f  task completed. Fol lowing th i s  ranking procedure, 
the experimenter sorted the shor t  form in to  fou r  groups so as to 
match subjects on the basis o f  i n i t i a l  task p r o d u c t i v i t y .
A f te r  the res t  per iod ,  the experimenter ca l led  sub jec ts '  a t t e n t io n  
to the ex is tence o f  markers p rev ious ly  a f f i x e d  to twenty o f  the classroom 
desks. Subjects were d i rec ted  to note the loca t ion  and label a f f i x e d  
to those desks tha t  were marked. The labeled desks were arranged 
in groups in the fou r  corners o f  the classroom. For la b e l ing  purposes, 
these groupings were i d e n t i f i e d  by the Roman numerals I through IV.
A f t e r  d i r e c t in g  sub jec ts '  a t t e n t io n  to the labeled desks, the 
experimenter announced th a t  from the o r ig in a l  group o f  approximately 
twenty sub jec ts ,  fou r  new groups were to be formed. The new groups 
were d i rec ted  to take up the loca t ions  designated ,by the labeled 
desks. The need f o r  the new groupings was a t t r i b u t e d  to the s t a t i s t i c a l  
nature o f  the comparisons to be made during the te s t  v a l i d a t io n  procedure.
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A f te r  these announcements the experimenter assigned sub jects  
to  the new groups on the basis o f  q u a n t i t y  o f  task completed on the 
p rev ious ly  scored short forms. Once subjects  had taken up t h e i r  
pos i t ions  in the assigned groupings, the experimenter d i s t r ib u te d  
the long form o f  the task w i th  each group rece iv ing  the appropr ia te  
vers ion o f  in s t r u c t i o n s .
Subjects were to ld  to read t h e i r  i n s t r u c t io n s  and to face forward 
when they had completed. When a l l  sub jects  had read t h e i r  i n s t r u c t io n s ,  
the experimenter s ta r ted  subjects on the long form o f  the "ap t i tud e  
t e s t "  and al lowed them to work un in te r rup ted  f o r  a period o f  45 minutes. 
Independent Variables
Experimental Bonus Cond i t ion ,  E^. Members o f  group received 
the long form o f  the task ,  a set o f  answer sheets and a sheet con ta in ing  
the fo l lo w in g  in s t r u c t io n s :
Please Note:
In order to determine i f  I can make more e f f i c i e n t  use 
o f  those th a t  vo lun teer  f o r  t h i s  t e s t  v a l id a t io n  p ro je c t ,  I 
w i l l  be o f f e r i n g  a bonus payment to members o f  one o f  the fo u r  
groups. This bonus w i l l  be in the form o f  cash, and the amount 
o f  money th a t  can be earned w i l l  depend upon the amount o f  p roo f ­
reading completed. Bonus payments w i l l  be at  the ra te  o f  4 
cents per l i n e .  This amounts to $2.00 per page. The amount 
o f  bonus earned w i l l  be determined separa te ly  f o r  each i n d iv id u a l ,  
and those working under the bonus system w i l l  receive t h e i r  
payment a t  the end o f  the te s t  per iod.
Group I has been selected as the t r i a l  group, and as
26
such w i l l  be the on ly  group to have the oppor tun i ty  to earn 
the bonus payment. Those in group I be sure to mark your answer 
sheet to in d ic a te  th a t  you w i l l  be rece iv ing  the bonus. Those 
in Groups I I ,  I I I ,  and IV please be sure to  ind ica te  on your 
answer sheet th a t  you w i l l  not be rece iv ing  the bonus.
Members o f  group E^ received th a t  vers ion o f  the answer sheet 
conta in ing a yes-no question concerning s u b je c t ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
the bonus program. Members o f  t h i s  group were in s t ruc te d  to ind ica te  
on t h e i r  answer sheet th a t  they were p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in the bonus program.
Experimental No Bonus Condi t ion ,  E Members o f  group E ^ 
received the long form o f  the task ,  a set o f  answer sheets and a 
sheet con ta in ing  the same in s t r u c t io n s  suppl ied to group E^. I t  
should be noted tha t  whereas group E^, the "m in o r i t y  rece iv ing  bonus" 
learned v ia  t h e i r  i n s t r u c t io n  sheet th a t  they were the on ly group 
to be rece iv ing  the bonus, group E "m a jo r i t y  rece iv ing  no bonus" 
was informed th a t  they, along w i th  groups I I I  and IV had been excluded 
from the bonus program. Members o f  group E ^ also received answer 
sheets con ta in ing the yes-no question regarding p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
the bonus program. However, due to t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  group membership 
they were required to  ind ica te  on t h e i r  answer sheet th a t  they had 
been excl uded from the bonus program.
Control f o r  the Experimental Bonus Cond i t ion ,  Cj_. Members of 
group C  ^ received the long form o f  the task ,  a set o f  answer sheets 
and a sheet con ta in ing  the fo l lo w in g  in s t r u c t io n s :
Please Note:
As you know, each o f  you is  rece iv ing  course c re d i t
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f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in t h i s  p ro je c t .  In a d d i t ion  to t h i s  extra 
c r e d i t  I am o f f e r i n g  a bonus payment as w e l l .  This payment 
w i l l  be in the form o f  cash, and the amount o f  money tha t  can 
be earned w i l l  depend upon the amount o f  proofreading completed. 
Bonus payments w i l l  be at  the ra te  o f  4 cents per l i n e .  This 
amounts to $2.00 per page. The amount o f  bonus earned w i l l  
be determined separate ly  f o r  each i n d iv id u a l ,  and the payments 
w i l l  be made a t  the end o f  the te s t  per iod.
I t  should be noted th a t  t h i s  group worked under the id e n t i c a l  
incen t ive  or bonus program as gijotip E^. However, group was to ld  
tha t  a l l  sub jects  in the experiment were working under the bonus 
cond i t ion .  Members o f  t h i s  group received th a t  vers ion o f  the answer 
sheet having no quest ion regarding p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in or exclusion 
from the bonus program.
Control f o r  Experimental No Bonus Cond i t ion ,  C Members o f  
group C ^ received the long form o f  the task ,  answer sheets and task 
in s t r u c t io n s .  The task in s t r u c t io n  sheet d i s t r i b u te d  to t h i s  group 
contained no in fo rmat ion  regarding the existence o f  a bonus program. 
The answer sheet used by t h i s  group also had no reference to the 
bonus program.
Dependent V a r ia b le s . P ro d u c t i v i t y  measures, generated during 
task complet ion,  were in the form o f  task q u a n t i t y  and task q u a l i t y .
A manipulat ion check was used to measure the e f fec t iveness  o f  
the experimental manipu la t ions.  This check consisted o f  a seven 
item t r u e - f a l s e  survey and was used to determine whether or not each 
sub ject  perceived his treatment cond i t ion  as intended. The nature
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o f  the-check questions was such th a t  one or more e r ro rs  cons t i tu te d  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  assuming a sub ject  had not understood his in s t ru c t io n s  
f u l l y  or  tha t  the manipu la t ion had in some way f a i l e d  in i t s  intended 
purpose. The manipu la t ion check may be found in Appendix J.
A f t e r  complet ing the manipu la t ion check, each sub ject  read descr ip ­
t ions  o f  the fo u r  treatment cond i t ions  and was asked to rank the 
cond i t ions  according to  the cond i t ions  r e la t i v e  a t t ra c t iv e n e s s .
A f te r  rank ing, sub jects  were asked to est imate what t h e i r  produc­
t i v i t y  would have been on the experimental task had they been in 
each o f  the treatment con d i t ion^  ^Appendix K).
Fol lowing the 45 minute te s t  period a l l  sub jects were debr ie fed,  
those subjects not working under the bonus cond i t ion  were dismissed 
and those working under the bonus cond i t ion  were paid.
S t a t i s t i c a l  A n a ly s is . Non-parametric s t a t i s t i c s  were the prefer red 
too ls  o f  analys is  since the data generated by t h i s  study are a t  the 
o rd ina l  leve l  o f  measurement, and there is  no basis f o r  the assumption 
o f  no rma l i ty  o f  score d i s t r i b u t i o n  as is  required f o r  the use o f  
parametric s t a t i s t i c s .
The Mann-Whitney U S t a t i s t i c  (Senter, 1966) was used on a l l  
comparisons concerning task qu a n t i t y  and task q u a l i t y .  The Wilcoxan 
Matched Pair Signed Ranks T - te s t  (Klugh, 1970) was used in the analys is 
o f  specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y  data. The Sign Test (Klugh, 1970) was 
used to  analyze a t t ra c t ive ne ss  ra t in g s .
Results
Manipula t ion Check
Three subjects  were d i s q u a l i f i e d  from group E^, three from
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group E ^  f ° ur fro™ group and one from group C ^ due to one or 
more er ro rs  on manipulat ion check i tems. Table 4 shows the number 
o f  sub jects  remaining in  each treatment cond i t ion  f o r  the remainder 
o f  ana lys is .
Bonus Program
Quant i ty .  Hypothesis 1 Qt(C^ > C ^) was accepted. The nu l l  
hypothesis Qt(C^ = C was re jec ted  a t  £  < .005, One Ta i l  Test.
Speculat ive P ro d u c t i v i t y .  Hypothesis 2 S.P.fC^ > C ^) was accepted. 
The nu l l  hypothesis S.P.(C^ = C ^) was re jec ted at £  < .0025, One 
Ta i l  Test.  * 1
A t t rac t iveness  Rat ing. Hypothesis 3 A.R.(C^ > C ^) was accepted.
The nu l l  hypothesis A.R.(C^ = C was re jec ted  at  £  < .00025, One 
Ta i l  Test.
Results o f  tes ts  o f  the f i r s t  three hypotheses demonstrate the 
intended experimental e f f e c t  o f  the bonus program. For a summary 
o f  the re s u l ts  see Table 1.
P i l o t  Group E f fec t
Quant i ty .  The Reinforcement Theory vers ion (H 5 a) o f  t h i s  
hypothesis , represented by the n u l l  hypothesis Qt(E^ = C^) was not 
re jec ted .  Consequently, n e i th e r  o f  the d i r e c t io n a l  hypotheses H 4 a 
(E q u i ty ) ,  nor H 6 a (Hawthorne E f f e c t ) ,  Qt(E^ < C^) and Qt(E^ > C^) 
was accepted.
Q ua l i ty .  The Reinforcement Theory vers ion (H 5 b) o f  t h i s  hypothesis, 
represented by the n u l l  hypothesis Q1(E^ = C^) was not re jec ted ,  
consequently ne i the r  o f  the d i r e c t io n a l  hypotheses H 4 b (Equ i ty )  nor 
H 6 b (Hawthorne E f fe c t )  both described by Q1 ( >  C^) was accepted.
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Specu lat ive P r o d u c t i v i t y . The Reinforcement Theory vers ion H 5 c 
o f  t h i s  hypothesis represented by the nu l l  hypothesis S.P.(E^ = C^) was 
not re jec ted .  Consequently, ne i th e r  o f  the d i r e c t io n a l  hypotheses 
H 4 c (Equ i ty )  nor H 6 c (Hawthorne E f fe c t )  S.P.(E < C^) and S.P.(E^ >
C^) r e s p e c t i v e l y , was accepted.
Atrac t iveness  Rating. The Reinforcement Theory vers ion (H 5 d) 
o f  t h i s  hypothesis, represented by the nu l l  hypothesis A.R.(E^ = C^), 
was not re jec ted .  Consequently, n e i the r  o f  the d i re c t io n a l  hypotheses 
H 4 d (Equi ty )  nor H 6 d (Hawthorne E f fe c t )  A.R.(E^ < C^) and (E^ >
C^) respec t ive ly  was accepted. * *■
\
Results o f  tes ts  o f  hypotheses 4 through 6 do not o f f e r  evidence 
f o r  the existence o f  unintended in f luences ac t ing  upon the performance 
o f  p i l o t  group members. For a summary o f  the re s u l ts  see Table 2.
Non-P i lo t  Group E f fe c t
Quant i ty .  The Reinforcement Theory vers ion (H 8 a) o f  t h i s  
hypothesis , represented by the n u l l  hypothesis Qt(En^ = C was 
not re jec ted .  Consequently, the d i re c t io n a l  hypothesis H 7 a (Equi ty )  
^ t(Enb < was n0  ^ accePted.
Q ua l i ty .  The Reinforcement Theory vers ion (H 8 b) o f  t h i s  hypothesis, 
represented by the n u l l  hypothesis Q l f E ^  = C ^ )  was not re je c ted .  Con­
sequently, the d i r e c t io n a l  hypothesis H 7 b (Equ i ty )  Q1 ( E^^ < C was 
not accepted.
Speculat ive P ro d u c t i v i t y .  The Reinforcement Theory vers ion (H 8 c) 
o f  t h i s  hypothesis, represented by the nu l l  hypothesis S- P-<En b = C nb> 
was not re jec ted .  Consequently, the d i r e c t io n a l  hypothesis H 7 c 
(E q u i ty ) ,  S.P.(En^ < C ^) was not accepted.
A t t rac t iveness  Rating. The d i re c t io n a l  hypothesis H 7 d (E qu i ty ) ,
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(E k < C was accepted. The nu l l  hypothesis A . R . ( E ^  = C was
re jec ted  at £  < .012, One Ta i l  Test.
Results o f  tes ts  o f  the dependent v a r ia b le  o f  task q u a n t i t y ,  
task q u a l i t y ,  and specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y  do not o f f e r  evidence 
f o r  unintended in f luences ac t ing  upon the performances o f  n o n -p i lo t  
group members. Results o f  treatment cond i t ion  a t t ra c t iv e n e s s  ra t ings  
o f f e r  evidence in support o f  socia l  comparison processes a c t ive  w i th in  
the p i l o t  g rou p /no n -p i lo t  group work environment. For a summary 
o f  these re su l ts  see Table 3.
Pi scu^sion
B r i e f l y ,  the re su l ts  o f  t h i s  study demonstrate th a t  (a) workers 
recognize and respond to the cash incen t ive  program in  a p o s i t i v e  
fash ion ,  (b) the work cond i t ion  o f  p re fe re n t ia l  t rea tment,  tha t  cond i t ion  
representing p i l o t  group membership, did not cause p i l o t  group members 
to respond d i f f e r e n t l y  than t h e i r  con tro l  group, (c) the work cond i t ion  
o f  r e la t i v e  d e p r iv a t io n ,  th a t  cond i t ion  representing n o n -p i lo t  group 
membership, caused n o n -p i lo t  group members to s ta te  a preference 
f o r  work cond i t ions  in  which no worker received a bonus over condi t ions 
in which only a se lec t  few received a bonus.
Subjects '  recogn i t ion  o f ,  and response to the bonus program
was cen tra l  to  the v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  study. The leg i t im acy  o f  the
bonus manipulat ion was demonstrated a t  the behavioral l e v e l ,  v ia
task qu a n t i t y  and a t  the cogn i t ive  leve l  v ia  specu la t ive  p r o d u c t i v i t y
le ve ls  and sta ted d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  the bonus cond i t ion .  The r e la t i o n -
*
ship between the behavioral and cogn i t ive  modes o f  sub ject  response 
is  noteworthy. Of primary importance was sub jec ts '  cog n i t ive  react ion
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to the bonus manipu la t ion.  I t  was c r i t i c a l  to the success o f  the 
p i l o t  group membership/non-membership.manipulation tha t  the bonus 
cond i t ion  be recognized as being more des i rab le  than the no bonus 
c on d i t ion .  Indeed t h i s  d e s i r a b i l i t y  was demonstrated. That the 
bonus cond i t ion  boosted behavioral response leve ls  served to v e r i f y  
the s e r v ic a b i1i t y  o f  the manipu la t ion.
E a r l i e r  the question had been asked "do incen t ive  te s t in g  p i l o t  
programs in f luence  the performance o f  p i l o t  group members in any 
systemat ic way which cannot be accounted f o r  s t r i c t l y  by the benef i ts  
being tested?" To help answer th^s quest ion comparisons were made 
between groups E^ and C^. S p e c i f i c a l l y  these comparisons were made 
in order to  asce r ta in  i f  workers rece iv ing  a cash incen t ive  representing 
p r e fe re n t ia l  t reatment would respond d i f f e r e n t l y  than workers rece iv ing  
the same cash incen t ive  when said incen t ive  is  o f fe red  to  a l l  workers. 
The re su l ts  o f  these comparisons were viewed w i th  Equi ty Theory, 
Reinforcement Theory and the Hawthorne E f fe c t  p red ic t ions  in mind.
Results did not o f f e r  support f o r  Equity Theory based p re d ic t io n s .  
Under the experimental cond i t ions  examined in t h i s  study, workers 
rece iv ing  p r e fe r e n t ia l  t reatment,  here representing members o f  a 
p i l o t  group, d id not respond as though they were being in equ i ta b ly  
overcompensated in comparison to t h e i r  n o n -p i lo t  group co-workers. 
Opposite the Equity Theory p red ic t ions  were the p red ic t ions  based 
upon the Hawthorne E f fe c t .  The Hawthorne E f fe c t  p red ic t ions  hold ing 
th a t  p r e fe re n t ia l  treatment would s t im u la te  or improve morale, r e s u l t i n g  
in improved performance also were not supported.
These comparisons, in v e s t ig a t in g  p i l o t  group behavior, revealed
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th a t  there was no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe ren ce  between the performance 
o f  workers rece iv ing  a bonus as p re fe re n t ia l  treatment and workers 
rece iv ing  the same leve l  o f  reward as standard payment. U l t im a te ly  
these re su l ts  showed th a t  workers working under the same condi t ions 
o f  re inforcement performed in l i k e  fashion i r re ga rd less  o f  po ten t ia l  
soc ia l  comparison in f luences .
The three way comparison between Equity Theory, Reinforcement 
Theory and the Hawthorne E f fe c t  does not represent a t r u l y  c r i t i c a l  
three way comparison. Although the Equity-Hawthorne E f fe c t  comparison 
p re d ic t in g  opposite d i r e c t i o n a l * t y  o f  re su l ts  was o f  a c r i t i c a l  na ture, 
the Reinforcement Theory p re d ic t io n  serves on ly to accommodate those 
re s u l ts  which u l t im a te ly  support ne i the r  Equi ty  Theory nor the Hawthorne 
E f fe c t .  The f a i l u r e  to r e je c t  the n u l l  hypothesis (E^ = C^) does 
not o f f e r  support f o r  the Reinforcement Theory p re d ic t i o n ,  i t  does 
at t h i s  po in t  however, seem s u f f i c i e n t  to a l low Reinforcement Theory 
to stand as the more parsimonious model o f  work behavior under the 
comparisons made.
The quest ion o f  cen t ra l  i n te r e s t  in t h i s  study was, "do incent ive  
te s t in g  p i l o t  programs adversely a f f e c t  the performance o f  n o n -p i lo t  
groups?" Comparisons were made between groups E ^ and C ^ in order 
to ascer ta in  i f  workers who are aware o f  but denied p a r t i c ip a t io n  
in a bonus program would perform d i f f e r e n t l y  than workers excluded 
from the same bonus program w i thou t  having knowledge o f  i t s  ex is tence.
Comparisons here did show tha t  workers recognize and respond 
to d i f fe rences  in treatment.  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  subjects  sta ted t h e i r  
preferences to work under cond i t ions  in which no workers received
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bonus payments ra the r  than under cond i t ions  in which only a se le c t  
few received bonus payments. Here support is  given f o r  the existence 
o f  soc ia l  comparison processes ac t ive  w i th in  the p i l o t  group/non­
p i l o t  group work s i t u a t i o n .  Workers do compare the d e s i r a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e i r  work cond i t ions  against  those o f  t h e i r  fe l lo w  workers. Under 
the cond i t ions  examined in t h i s  s tudy, workers d i s l i k e  f o r  the d i f ­
ferences in treatment d id  not cause any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rences  in 
the q u a n t i t y  or  q u a l i t y  o f  work u n i ts  produced.
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i f  the p i l o t  g rou p /no n -p i lo t  group cond i t ions  
examined p a ra l l e l s  the overpay/Anderpay cond i t ions  o f  Equity Theory 
i t  i s  l i k e l y  th a t  workers would be more se n s i t i v e  to the n o n -p i lo t  
group cond i t ions  than the p i l o t  group cond i t ions  j u s t  as workers 
are more se n s i t i v e  to  the cond i t ions  o f  underpayment in e q u i t y  than 
they are to overpayment in e q u i t y .  Results show th a t  subjects  apparent ly  
do not experience any form o f  anx ie ty  when presented w i th  the p i l o t  
group manipu la t ion however, when confronted w i th  the n o n -p i lo t  group 
manipu la t ion subjects  are motivated to show t h e i r  d isp leasure w i th  
the work s i t u a t io n .
I f  the p i l o t  g rou p /n o n -p i lo t  group comparison is  conceptua l ly  
s im i l a r  to  the overpayment/underpayment inequ i ty  comparison i t  appears 
reasonable th a t  in f luences a f f e c t in g  n o n -p i lo t  groups would be more 
re a d i l y  measured than in f luences a f f e c t in g  p i l o t  groups. Along t h i s  
l i n e  o f  reasoning re su l ts  do o f f e r  test imony in support o f  t h i s  s i m i l a r ­
i t y  o f  concepts.
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BONUS? yes  no
1)    .  ________
2)     1 ____
3)    .____  ___
4)  ____ ____ ____
5)  ____ ___  ___
6)      ___
7 )  ___  ___ ______
8) _    ___
9)  ____ ___  ___
1 0 )      ____
1 1 )     ' ___
1 2 )      ___
1 3 ) _______ ____ ___
1 4 ) _______ ___  ___
15 ) ______  ____ ____
16 )      ___
17)__ ____ ___  ____
18 )      ___
19) _______ ___  ___
2 0)      ___
21)      ___
2 2 )      ___
23 ) _______ ___  ___
2 4 ) _______ ___  ___
25)
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ID____
BONUS? 
2 6 ) _
27)  ____
2 8 ) ____
29)  ____
30)  ____
31)  ____
32)
3*0
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)
40)
41) 
*12 )
43)
44)
45)
46)
47)
48)
49 )
50)
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Appendix E
This is  the shor t  form o f  the proofreading a p t i tude  t e s t .  I t  
is  labe led ,  Proofreading Ap t i tude  S. This t e s t  cons is ts  o f  ten num­
bered l in e s  o f  randomly disp layed symbols. To the l e f t  o f  each l i n e  
is  a set o f  fou r  separate symbols and to  the r i g h t  o f  each l i n e  is  a 
ser ies o f  fo u r  blank spaces.
INSTRUCTIONS:
1) Determine the number o f  times each o f  the symbols shown at  the 
l e f t  o f  each l i n e  appears embedded in tha t  p a r t i c u l a r  l i n e .
2) Record the number o f  t imes each symbol appears per l i n e  in  the 
space provided at the r i g h t  o f  each l i n e .
3) Because there  are fo u r  symbols to  the l e f t  o f  each l i n e ,  you w i l l  
be "proo f read ing"  each l i n e  fou r  t imes. One t ime f o r  each symbol.
EXAMPLE:
<? $ t & 1) !#(?%<£&*$+(*&#<£%$#!$@%#(/:$%$#<t$&<t$* (1 _2_ _4_ _5_  __
# % *  ? 2) $#@+V'?$*&#<£!&£<£%#) (*&$%+$V?1 #?1 (2 ___  ___  ___  ___
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This i s  the long form o f  the proofreading t e s t .  I t  i s  labeled 
Proofreading Ap t i tude  L. The long form o f  t h i s  t e s t  is  very s im i l a r  to 
the shor t  form w i th  which you are f a m i l i a r .  The only notable d i f fe re n c e  
between the two forms is  the manner in  which the score f o r  each l i n e  
is  recorded. The long form requ ires  th a t  you record your answers on 
a separate answer sheet.
INSTRUCTIONS:
1) Determine the number o f  times each o f  the symbols shown a t  the l e f t  
o f  each l i n e  appears embedded in th a t  p a r t i c u l a r  l i n e .
2) Record in  the appropr ia te  space on the answer sheet, the number o f  
t imes each symbol appears per l i n e .
3) Because there  are fo u r  symbols to the l e f t  o f  each l i n e ,  you w i l l  
be "p roo f read ing"  each l i n e  fou r  t imes. One f o r  each symbol.
PLEASE NOTE:
In order to determine i f  I can make more e f f i c i e n t  use o f  those 
th a t  vo lunteer  f o r  t h i s  t e s t  v a l i d a t io n  p r o je c t ,  I w i l l  be o f f e r in g  a 
bonus payment to the members o f  one o f  the fou r  groups. This bonus w i l l  
be in the form o f  cash, and the amount o f  money th a t  can be earned w i l l  
depend upon the amount o f  "p roof read ing"  completed. Bonus payments 
w i l l  be a t  the ra te  o f  4<£ per l i n e .  This amounts to $2.00 per page.
The amount o f  bonus earned w i l l  be determined separate ly  f o r  each 
i n d i v id u a l ,  and those working under the bonus system w i l l  receive t h e i r  
payment a t  the end o f  the t e s t  period.
Group I has been se lected as the t r i a l  group, and as such w i l l  be 
the on ly  group to have the o p po r tun i ty  to earn the bonus payment.
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Those in Group I please be sure to  mark your answer sheet to 
th a t  you w i l l  be rece iv ing  the bonus. Those in Groups I I ,  I I  
please be sure to in d ic a te  on your answer sheet th a t  you w i l l  
rece iv ing  the bonus.
in d ica te  
I and IV 
not be
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This is  the long form o f  the proofreading ap t i tude  t e s t .  I t  is  
labeled Proofreading Ap t i tude  L. The long form o f  t h i s  t e s t  i s  very 
s im i l a r  to  the short  form w i th  which you are f a m i l i a r .  The on ly  notable 
d i f fe re n c e  between the two forms is  the manner in  which the score f o r  
each l i n e  is  recorded. The long form requires  tha t  you record your 
answers on a separate answer sheet.
INSTRUCTIONS:
1) Determine the number o f  t imes each o f  the symbols shown a t  the l e f t
* 1
o f  each l i n e  appears embedded in th a t  p a r t i c u la r  l i n e .
2) Record, in the appropr ia te  space on the answer sheet, the number o f  
t imes each symbol appears per l i n e .
3) Because there are fou r  symbols to the l e f t  o f  each l i n e ,  you w i l l  
be "p roof read ing"  each l i n e  fou r  t imes. One t ime f o r  each symbol.
PLEASE NOTE:
As you know, each o f  you is  rece iv ing  course c r e d i t  f o r  p a r t i c i ­
pat ing in t h i s  p ro je c t .  In ad d i t ion  to t h i s  extra c r e d i t ,  I am o f f e r in g  
a bonus payment as w e l l .  This payment w i l l  be in the form o f  cash, and 
the amount o f  money th a t  can be earned w i l l  depend upon the amount o f  
"p roof read ing"  completed. Bonus payments w i l l  be at the ra te  o f  4<£ 
per l i n e .  This amounts to $2.00 per page. The amount o f  bonus earned 
w i l l  be determined separa te ly  f o r  each in d iv i d u a l ,  and payments w i l l  
be made a t  the end o f  the t e s t  per iod.
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This is  the long form o f  the proofreading a p t i tu d e  te s t .  I t  is  
labe led ,  Proofreading Apt i tude  L. The long form o f  t h i s  t e s t  is  very 
s im i la r  to the shor t  form w i th  which you are f a m i l i a r .  The on ly notable 
d i f fe re n c e  between the two forms is  the manner in which the score f o r  
each l i n e  i s  recorded. The long form requires  th a t  you record your 
answers on a separate answer sheet.
INSTRUCTIONS:
1) Determine the number o f  times each o f  the symbols shown at  the l e f t  
o f  each l i n e  appears embedded in th a t  p a r t i c u l a r  l i n e .
2) Record, in the appropr ia te  space on the answer sheet, the number o f  
t imes each symbol appears per l i n e .
3) Because there  are fou r  symbols to the l e f t  o f  each l i n e  you w i l l  be 
proofreading each l i n e  fou r  t imes, one t ime f o r  each symbol.
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The purpose o f  our working together  t h i s  afternoon is  to  determine 
the usefulness o f  a new proofreading te s t  which is  to be used in  the 
p re d ic t io n  o f  proofreading a b i l i t y .  As you may know, proofreading is  
a s k i l l  which is  not necessa r i ly  re la te d  to i n t e l l i g e n c e  or reading 
a b i l i t y .  About the on ly th in g  proofreading s k i l l  has been re la ted  to 
so f a r  is  a person's score on an actual proofreading te s t .
I am presen t ly  in the process o f  developing a less cumbersome and 
t ime consuming t e s t  w i th  which to  measure proofreading a b i l i t y .
This afternoon you w i l l  be working on a new form o f  proofreading 
t e s t .  A f t e r  working on the new form you w i l l  take a few minutes, a t  the 
end o f  the per iod ,  to  complete the C a l i f o r n ia  Test o f  Proofreading 
A p t i tu de ,  (show CTPA). The CTPA has been shown to be a useful  too l  
in  p re d ic t in g  proofreading s k i l l .  From your scores on these two tes ts  
I w i l l  be able to  make some useful comparisons. I f ,  f o r  ins tance,  
those o f  you th a t  score high on one te s t  score high on the o ther t e s t  and 
those th a t  score low on one score low on the o the r ,  the two tes ts  w i l l  
roughly equal in measuring proofreading ap t i tude .  And because the CTPA 
is a very good p re d ic to r  o f  proofreading s k i l l ,  the new te s t  w i l l  be a 
good p re d ic to r  as w e l l .
In the i n te r e s t  o f  developing the simplest t e s t  poss ib le  I w i l l  
be g iv ing  you a long form as well  as a short  form o f  the new t e s t .  You 
w i l l  be tes ted on the shor t  form f i r s t .
Again, the reason f o r  a l l  t h i s  te s t in g  is  to  f i n d  a t e s t  th a t  w i l l  
be less cumbersome, less c o s t l y  and more e a s i ly  administered than the 
C a l i f o r n ia  Test o f  Proofreading A p t i tu d e .
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Let me add at  t h i s  p o in t  th a t  the more l in e s  you "proofread" on 
t h i s  new t e s t ,  the more va luable your scores w i l l  be in the v a l i d a t io n  
process. This is  because o f  the s t a t i s t i c a l  nature o f  the comparisons 
being made. Needless to say, you should s t i l l  s t r i v e  to be as accurate 
as you can w i th  your scores. Now l e t  me hand out your i n s t r u c t io n s .
Please read your in s t r u c t io n s  c a r e f u l l y ,  as I mentioned, I am 
attempting to develop a t e s t  re q u i r in g  a minimum o f  c l e r i c a l  admini­
s t r a t i o n .  I t  is  hoped th a t  you wnll  rece ive  a l l  the in fo rmat ion  you 
need from the w r i t t e n  in s t r u c t io n s .  Therefore, I w i l l  not be able to 
answer any questions u n t i l  the te s t in g  is  complete. I f  you have a 
comment to  o f f e r  regarding the w r i t t e n  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  I w i l l  be happy 
to hear them as soon as the te s t in g  i s  complete.
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Please respond True or False to the fo l lo w in g  statements. You 
need not t r y  to  second guess the exp e r im e n te r , - th is  is  on ly  a check to 
see how wel l  you read your i n s t r u c t io n s .
T F We were a l l  performing the same task ,  i . e . ,  "p roo f read ing . "
T F I w i l l  receive ex t ra  c r e d i t  f o r  my p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
T F A l l  p a r t i c ip a n ts  w i l l  receive extra  c r e d i t  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
T F Myself and most o f  the o ther  p a r t i c ip a n ts  w i l l  not be rece iv ing
cash, however those in tone o f  the groups w i l l  be rece iv ing  cash 
f o r  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
T F I was in the one group th a t  w i l l  receive cash, however most w i l l
not receive cash f o r  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
T F We w i l l  a l l  be paid cash f o r  our p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
T F No one w i l l  receive cash f o r  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
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This experiment de a l t  w i th  4 separate experimental cond i t ions  or  
groups:
Group A. Received ex t ra  c r e d i t  plus cash (4<£ per l i n e  scored or  $2.00
f o r  complet ing the t e s t )  f o r  t h e i r  e f f o r t s .  This group was 
to ld  th a t  i t  was the only  group o f  the 4 to  receive the cash 
bonus.
Group B. Received extra  c r e d i t  but no cash f o r  t h e i r  e f f o r t s .  This
group was to ld  th a t  i t  vwas one o f  3 groups rece iv ing  no cash
and th a t  one o f  the 4 groups was rece iv ing  a cash bonus.
Group C. Received extra  c r e d i t  plus cash and was to ld  th a t  a l l  4 groups
were rece iv ing  the same treatment.
Group D. Received extra  c r e d i t  but no cash and was to ld  th a t  a l l  4
groups were rece iv ing  the same treatment.
Please rank the 4 groups according to t h e i r  a t t ra c t ive ne ss  to you. 
Assign one l e t t e r  to  each o f  the blanks below. 1 = most, 4 = lea s t  
a t t r a c t i v e .
1 _ 2 _______  3  4 ____
Please i d e n t i f y  by l e t t e r  which o f  the 4 groups you were in .  _____
Please w r i te  the number o f  l in e s  you completed on the long form o f  the 
"a p t i tu d e  t e s t . "  _____
Now please speculate as to how many l i n e s  you th in k  you would have 
completed had you been in each o f  the o ther  cond i t ions .
I f  I was in  group "A" I would have completed   l in e s  because,
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I f  I was in  group "B" I  would have completed _____  l in e s  because,
I f  I was in  group "C" I would have completed   l in e s  because,
I f  I was in group "D" I would have completed _____  l in e s  because,
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